In an international Cournot duopoly, we determine the optimal contract for a brand name collaboration where the contract consists of …xed-fee and output royalty. We show that the …rms always have the incentive for brand name collaboration. However, whether the optimal contract will have positive …xed-fee and positive royalty is not immediate and it depends on the factors such as the transportation cost of exporting and the consumers'initial perception about the products of the …rms re ‡ected in the consumers'maximum willingness to pay for the products. Thus, our paper shows that the possibility of brand name collaboration is signi…cantly more than predicted in the existing literature.
Introduction
Many …rms from developed countries are making collaborative agreements with the …rms from developing countries in recent years. The collaborative agreements not only involve transfers of superior technologies, there are many instances when the developed-country …rms allow the developing country …rms to use their brand names, which may create a positive marketing e¤ect as documented in Sullivan (1998) . While there is a vast literature considering collaborative agreement involving production technologies, 1 the issue of brand name collaborartion, although empirically relevant, did not get much attention in the literature. As an example of brand name collaboration, let's consider the case of Ford-Otosan, formerly known as Otosan Otomobil Sanayii based in Istanbul. In 2008, Ford, the American automobile company, which is one of the biggest commercial vehicle manufacturers and exporters in Turkey conferred its brand name to Otosan. After the collaborative deal between the two companies its products are simply branded as Ford-Otosan and the revenue of the Otosan automobile company grew up reasonably. This may be because Ford made the products more appealing to the customers because of its brand name. Marjit et al. (2007) provide several examples of brand name collaboration. Aaker and Keller (1990) and Tauber (1988) on brand extensions reveal that co-branding arrangements forms positive consumer perceptions about a particular brand. In a report on Swedish …rms in India, Paulsson (1986) found that the competitive …rm licenses its brand name in order to exploit export opportunities.
To the best of our knowledge, Marjit et al. (2007) is the only paper that shows the pro…tability of a brand name collaboration under a …xed payment. It is needless to say that the total bene…ts from collaborative agreements involve bene…ts from technology transfers as well as from brand name collaborations. However, as correctly pointed out by Marjit et al. (2007) , while these e¤ects may be di¢ cult to separate empirically, one must try to understand their theoretical implications. Against this backdrop, the purpose of this paper is to determine the optimal brand name collaboration agreement between a developed-country …rm and a developing-country …rm when the developed-country …rm posses a superior brand name than its developing-country counterpart.
We consider an international Cournot duopoly model where a developed-country …rm and a developing-country …rm compete in the developing country with homogeneous products. The developed-country …rm posses a superior brand name and needs to incur a per-unit transportation cost of exporting. The developed-country …rm can transfer its brand name to the developing-country …rm against an up-front …xed-fee and a per-unit output royalty. In order to focus on the brand name collaboration only, we assume away any technology difference across the …rms. We show that the developed-country …rm always has the incentive to transfer its brand name to the developing-country …rm. However, whether the optimal contract will have positive …xed-fee and positive royalty is not immediate and it depends on the factors such as the transportation cost of exporting and the consumers'initial perception about the products of the developed-country …rm and the developing-country …rm re ‡ected in the consumers'maximum willingness to pay for the products.
Our analysis di¤ers from Marjit et al. (2007) in some important ways. Unlike them, we consider a more general collaborative agreement involving both a …xed payment and a royalty payment depending on the output. We show how the optimal collaborative agreement depends on the transportation cost of exporting and the consumers' initial di¤erence in the maximum willingness to pay. While Marjit et al. (2007) , considering brand name collaboration under a …xed-fee only, show that it occurs between similarly reputed …rms, our analysis, considering both …xed-fee and output royalty, shows that it occurs under any feasible di¤erence in the reputation. Thus, we show that the possibility of brand name collaboration is signi…cantly higher than predicted by Marjit et al. (2007) .
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 derives the results. Section 4 concludes.
The model
Assume that there is a developed country and a developing country. There is a …rm in each country. Assume that …rm 1 is in the developed country and …rm 2 is in the developing country. These …rms produce homogeneous products. We assume that the …rms compete in the developing country like Cournot duopolists. Assume that the inverse market demand functions faced by …rms 1 and 2 are respectively:
where a 1 > a 2 > 0. As in Marjit et al. (2007) , the di¤erence in the consumers'maximum willingness to pay for the products of …rms 1 and 2 is due to di¤erent reputation of these …rms. We assume that the consumers perceive the product of …rm 1 better than …rm 2 and it is re ‡ected in a higher maximum willingness to pay for the product of …rm 1 than for the product of …rm 2. Hence, …rm 1 has a more reputed brand name than …rm 2.
In order to show the e¤ects of brand name collaboration, we assume away any di¤erence in the cost of production. For simplicity, we assume that the constant marginal costs of production are zero. However, we assume that …rm 1 needs to incur a per-unit transportation cost of exporting, t( 0).
The timing of the game is as follows. At stage 1, …rm 1 o¤ers a take-it-or-leave-it collaborative agreement to …rm 2 consisting of an up-front …xed-fee (F > 0) and a per-unit output royalty (r > 0). Firm 2 accepts the o¤er if it is not worse o¤ by accepting the o¤er than rejecting the o¤er. At stage 2, the …rms produce like Cournot duopolists and the pro…ts are realised. We solve the game through backward induction.
The results
Let us …rst consider the situation under no collaborative agreement, which provides the reservation payo¤s of the …rms. Under no collaborative agreement, …rms 1 and 2 maximise the following expressions:
Straightforward calculations show that the equilibrium outputs as
It is immediate that both …rms produce positive outputs under no collaboration for any t if t < 2a1 a2 2 and 2a 2 > a 1 . We assume that it holds.
The respective payo¤s are:
We now consider the case under collaborative agreement where …rm 1 allows …rm 2 to use its brand name and charges a non-negative up-front …xed-fee, F , and a per-unit nonnegative output royalty, r. Under the collaborative agreement, …rms 1 and 2 determine the respective outputs to maximise the following expressions:
The equilibrium outputs are q
subject to
F; r > 0 and q
The constraints (9) and (10) show the participation constraints of …rms 1 and 2 respectively. Condition (11) shows the non-negativity constraints for F , r and the outputs.
Since …rm 1 o¤ers a take-it-or-leave-it contract to …rm 2, the optimal up-front …xed fee must satisfy
Hence, …rm 1's maximisation problem (eq. 8) reduces to the following M ax r c;t
subject to the non-negativity constraints.
Ignoring the non-negativity constraints on r, we get the optimal per-unit output royalty as r = 1 2 (a 1 5t). If t > a1 5 , the non-negativity constraint implies that the optimal royalty is zero. The corresponding equilibrium up-front …xed fee is F = 4 9 (a 2 + t) (a 1 a 2 ). If t < a1 5 , the equilibrium royalty is r = 1 2 (a 1 5t), which satis…es the constraint for positive outputs, i.e., 2r a 1 < t < a1+r 2 . The corresponding equilibrium …xed-fee is F = 1 9 (2a 2 a 1 + 7t) (a 1 2a 2 + 5t). Given our assumption of 2a 2 > a 1 (which is required for the positive output of …rm 2 under no collaboration for any t), F > 0 for t > , we get that F = 0, implying that the collaborative agreement consists of only output royalty for t < 2a2 a1 5
. The equilibrium output royalty in this situation follows from …rm 2's participation constraint and is r = (a 1 a 2 ) .
It is easy to check that while the above contracts make …rm 2 indi¤erent between collaboration and no collaboration, …rm 1 is always better o¤ under collaboration compared with no collaboration, suggesting that brand name collaboration always occurs if …rm 1 can choose the up-front …xed-fee and the output royalty.
We summarise the above discussion in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Brand name collaboration agreement always takes place between …rms 1 and 2. The equilibrium collaborative agreements are: (a) When 0 6 t 6 2a2 a1 5
, the equilibrium …xed-fee is zero and the equilibrium royalty is r = (a 1 a 2 ) .
(b) When , the equilibrium …xed-fee is F = 4 9 (a 2 + t) (a 1 a 2 ) and the equilibrium royalty is zero.
The reason for the above proposition is as follows. There are two motives for brand name collaboration. On the one hand, it tends to increase the industry pro…t by increasing the consumers'maximum willingness to pay for …rm 2's product. On the other hand, it tends to increase the industry pro…t by increasing the output of …rm 2 and reducing the output of …rm 1, thus saving the transportation cost. Firm 1 can extract the bene…t from brand name collaboration through …xed-fee and output royalty. The output royalty also helps to soften competition ex-post collaboration by increasing …rm's marginal cost.
If the transportation cost is very small, the competition softening e¤ect of royalty becomes the dominant factor and …rm 1 charges the royalty rate in a way so that the market shares of the …rms remain the same under collaboration and no collaboration. Hence, in this situation, the equilibrium …xed-fee is zero. On the other hand, if the transportation cost is su¢ ciently high, …rm 1's market share is small, and the transportation cost saving motive encourages …rm 1 to increase …rm 2's bene…t from collaboration as high as possible. In this situation, …rm 1 does not have any incentive to distort …rm 2's output choice by imposing a positive output royalty. Hence, …rm 1 charges only positive …xed-fee and zero royalty for su¢ ciently high transportation cost. For intermediate transportation cost, both the competition softening e¤ect and the transportation cost saving e¤ect are important and …rm 1 prefers to charge positive …xed-fee and positive output royalty.
Although the implications of a positive transportation cost and output royalty follow from the above result, it may worth highlighting them here. It follows from Proposition 1(a) that if there is no transportation cost, as considered in 1(b) ). However, if the transportation cost is high, as in Proposition 1(c), …rm 1 charges only an up-front …xed-fee. This situaiton justi…es the …xed-fee contarct considered in Marjit et al. (2007) , even if there is no imitation and the outputs of …rm 2 are veri…able. Thus, we show that the value of the transportation cost plays an important role in determining the optimal collaborative agreement.
The above analysis also suggests that the presence of output royalty ensures that brand name collaboration occurs always, which is in contrast to Marjit et al. (2007) . Marjit et al. (2007) considered only …xed-fee, and therefore, ignored the competition softening e¤ect of output royalty. Hence, brand name collaboration was not pro…table in their analysis if the brand names of …rms 1 and 2 were su¢ ciently di¤erent, since brand name collaboration would expose …rm 1 to a …erce competition from …rm 2. However, the use of an output royalty in our analysis allows …rm 1 to control the intensity of competition by a¤ecting …rm 2's marginal cost. In fact, …rm 1 can always keep the same intensity of competition after brand name collaboration to that of before brand name collaboration by charging an output royalty equal to (a 1 a 2 ) . This competition softening e¤ect of royalty creates the possibility of a pro…table collaboration always in our analysis.
Like the existing literature (Marjit et al., 2007) , we conduct our analysis under the assumption that the antritrust law prevents collusive agreement between the …rms. The anti-competitive nature of the collusive agreement may induce the antirust authority to prevent collusion between the …rms. The non-negativity constraints on the …xed-fee and output royalty considered in our analysis re ‡ect this restriction. For example, if we ignore transportation cost and also ignore the non-negativity constraint on the …xed-fee and output royalty, the equilibrium royalty rate is r = a1 2 . It is easy to check that this royalty rate allows …rm 1 to produce like a monopolist and …rm 1 can satisfy …rm 2's participation constraint by paying …rm 2 its reservation payo¤. However, the non-negativity constraint on the …xed-fee, due to the antitrust law, prevents …rm 1 from charging so high royalty. We assume that the antitrust law is also responsible for preventing merger between the …rms. Moreover, merger agreements often involve signi…cant costs due to organizational, managerial and technological reasons (see, e.g., Hart and Tirole, 1990 and Beladi et al. 2009 ) and these costs associated with merger may make merger as an unpro…table option. If we follow this line of justi…cation, it is then implicit in our analysis that the cost of brand name transfer is lower than the cost of forming a merger. It is intuitive that if the …rms could merge, the …rms could earn higher pro…ts compared to the brand name collaboration considered in this paper.
Conclusion
Although brand name collaboration is empirically relevant, the theoretical literature did not pay much attention to this aspect. In an international Cournot duopoly, we determine the optimal contract for a brand name collaboration where the contract consists of …xed-fee and output royalty. We show that the …rms always have the incentive for brand name collaboration. However, whether the optimal contract will have positive …xed-fee and positive royalty is not immediate and it depends on the factors such as the transportation cost of exporting and the consumers' initial perception about the products of the …rms re ‡ected in the consumers' maximum willingness to pay for the products. Thus, our paper shows that the possibility of brand name collaboration is signi…cantly more than predicted in the existing literature.
